E-Finance: An Introduction

E-finance is defined as “The provision of financial services and markets using electronic communication and computation”. In this paper we outline research issues related to e-finance that we believe set the stage for further work in this field. Three areas are focused on. These are the use of electronic payments systems, the operations of financial services firms and the operation of financial markets. A number of research issues are raised. For example, is the widespread use of paper-based checks efficient? Will the financial services industry be fundamentally changed by the advent of the Internet? Why have there been such large differences in changes to market microstructure across different financial markets?     

How Do Investors Regard ESOs?

All top‐50 and more than 80% of the top‐500 Australian listed companies now reward their executives with stock options (ESOs) of one kind or another.₁ We address the question: “Which method of accounting for ESOs — current practice, the US FASB's recommended practice or the AASB's preferred position — most closely reflects investors' pricing decisions?” We answer the question using models that relate a company's stock price to its earnings and book value of equity calculated according to these three choices of accounting treatment.     

Employee Reload Options: Pricing, Hedging, and Optimal Exercise

Reload options, call options granting new options on exercise,are popularly used in compensation. Although the compound optionfeature may seem complicated, there is a distribution-free dominantpolicy of exercising reload options whenever they are in themoney. The optimal policy implies general formulas for numericalvaluation. Simpler formulas for valuation and hedging followfrom Black–Scholes assumptions with or without continuousdividends. Time vesting affects the optimal policy, but numericalresults indicate that it is nearly optimal to exercise in themoney whenever feasible. The results suggest that reload optionsproduce similar incentives as employee stock options and sharegrants.     

Unit initial public offerings: Staged equity or signaling mechanism?

We investigate the use of unit (i.e., package) initial public offerings by Australian industrial firms and conclude that their use reflects their role as a signaling mechanism (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997), as distinct from the agency–cost explanation offered by Schultz (1993). From a sample of 394 IPOs between 1976 and 1994, the 66 firms making unit offerings are typically riskier, use less prestigious underwriters and have a lower level of retained ownership than other IPO firms. While these results are also consistent with Schultz's agency cost explanation, other results we report are not. We find no difference in underpricing etween unit IPOs and other IPO firms, nor are there any significant differences in the planned uses of proceeds reported in the prospectus, post–listing failure rates or secondary equity offerings of the type predicted by Schultz. We do however, report evidence consistent with a prediction unique to the signaling explanation. After controlling for the level of ownership retained by insiders, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants is increasing in IPO firms' riskiness.     

Discussion of “Differential Market Reactions to Revenue and Expense Surprises”

Ertimur et al. (2003, this issue) study the difference in the market;s reaction to revenue versus expense surprises. The discussion first reviews their main findings and assesses the paper's potential contributions. Alternative explanations are then considered for the base-line result that the market reacts more to revenue surprises than to expense surprises. The hypothesized reasons for revenue surprises to matter more are critiqued, as are the tests of the hypotheses, and potential extensions that would link these test to financial statement analysis are suggested. Finally, two aspects of the assessment of how the reaction to revenue and expense surprises differs across value and growth firms are discussed: The definitions of value and growth firms and the potential benefits of assessing why analyst revenue forecasts are (not) observed for many value (growth) firms.     

Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany

Recent empirical work shows evidence for higher valuation of firms in countries with a better legal environment. We investigate whether differences in the quality of firm‐level corporate governance also help to explain firm performance in a cross‐section of companies within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a broad corporate governance rating (CGR) for German public firms, we document a positive relationship between governance practices and firm valuation. There is also evidence that expected stock returns are negatively correlated with firm‐level corporate governance, if dividend yields are used as proxies for the cost of capital. An investment strategy that bought high‐CGR firms and shorted low‐CGR firms earned abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual basis during the sample period.     

Daniel Süss

Ohne Zusammenfassung